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RECENT CASES
AccREmoN-DREDGING.-GILLIHAN V. CIELOHA, 145 PAC. (ORE.) Io6I.-
Held, where a slough between two islands is practically filled by accre-
tion caused by a dyke, and the alluvion is added to by waste from a
dredger distributed by high waters, the land so formed will not be
treated as the product of avulsion, and, in the absence of a claim by the
general government will be apportioned between the shore owners.
Accretion is the gradual deposition by natural causes of soil adding
to that land already in the possession of the owner. 3 Washburn, Real
Property, (6th Ed.) 7o. The doctrine of accretion is based on the right
of the shore owner not to be shut off from the water (Steers v. City
of Brooklyn, ioI N. Y. 5), and in a reciprocal consideration for possible
loss by erosion. 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 262. It is immaterial
whether the water be navigable or not. Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo. 209;
Lovingston v. St. Clair County, 64 Ill. 56. The fact that accretion is
aided by artificial means does not necessarily destroy its character as
such. 3 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights, 2486. But where the
water front is fixed by statute and the addition of soil is caused by pur-
presture, the doctrine does not apply. Dana v. Jackson Street Wharf Co.,
31 Cal. 118. The process by which a large quantity of land is suddenly
added to the shore by its severance bodily from its former location, as by
the cutting of a new channel by a river, is avulsion. i Farnham, Waters
and Water Rights, 320; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359.
The principal case holds that shore owners are the owners of any arti-
ficial extension of their lands, as against everyone but the state. The
decision is founded on the right of shore owners to have access to the
water. Waste from a dredger is neither accretion nor the product of
avulsion. The case would seem to mark an extension of the rules of
original acquisition of land. If, however, the accretion had so far
advanced before the dredging began that title to the new land had already
vested in the owners the case would fall under the regular rules of
accretion.
BANKRUPTcy-ExEMPTION-TImE OF FiLiNG CLAIm OF HomEsTEAD.-
BRANDT V. MAYHEW ET UX.,---IN RE MAYHEW, 218 FED. 42.-Held, that
where the right of the bankrupt to file his schedules after adjudication
had not been questioned, his claim of a homestead exemption in his
schedules, as he was permitted by law to do, was in time. Ross, Circuit
Judge, dissenting.
While the exemptions allowed a bankrupt are those provided for by the
statutes of the state, the time and manner of claiming such exemptions,
and of awarding them and setting them apart, are regulated by the
Bankruptcy Act. In re Burnham, 202 Fed. 763; In re Kane, 127 Fed.
552. As the claim of a bankrupt to exemption is a personal right, it is
waived unless asserted in due time. In re ExuM, 209 Fed. 716; In re
Harrngtolt, 2oo Fed. IoO; In re Gerker, 186 Fed. 693. Whether an
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application for an exemption has been made in due time is for thedetermination of the referee subject to review by the court, if desired bythe bankrupt or creditors. It re Dobb, 175 Fed. 319. A claim for anallowance of an exemption in involuntary proceedings is in effective timeif made by the bankrupt in his schedules. lit re Le Vay, 125 Fed. 99o.
Generally where the claim is made in good faith and for the benefit ofhis family, a bankrupt is permitte'd to amend his schedules at any timebefore sale or distribution and after adjudication to assert an exemption
omitted by mistake or to assert a further claim to exemptions allowedhim by the state law. Goodman v. Curtis, 174 Fed. 644; In re Maxson,
17o Fed. 356; lit re Fisher, 142 Fed. 205; In re Moran, io5 Fed. 901;
Collier on Bankruptcy, 7 ed., 146. But, though the court as a rule exer-cises great liberality in permitting amendments, it does not favor the
extension by amendment of exemptions where such extension will work
solely for the benefit of a creditor. In re Merry, 2ol Fed. 369; Moran v.King, III Fed. 73o; It re Moran, supra. The provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act that the trustee shall be vested with the title of the bankrupt
as of the date of adjudication, "except in so far as it is to property which
is exempt," does not show an intent that the claim of exemption musthave been made prior to adjudication; In re Fisher, supra; and the state-ment of the dissenting judge in the principal case that that date is the
"dead line" cannot be said to accord with the authorities. Where the
time for filing schedules is extended that extension operates to extend
the time for claiming exemptions. Collier on Bankruptcy, 7 ed., 146.
BILLS AND NoTEs-LxAniTy OF AGENT-ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL Evi-
DENCE.-MERCHANTS BANK OF MOUNT VERNON V. JONES, 173 S. W.
(TEXAS) 6o6.-Held, where an agent signed his own name to a negotiableinstrument without adding words to indicate his agency, he is personally
liable in an action by the payee, even though he disclosed his agency at the
time of the transaction. (Not decided under the N. I. L.)
By the common law rule, an agent, whose name appeared on a nego-
tiable instrument which did not disclose his principal, was solely liable.
Slurdivant v. Hull, 59 Me. 172. In such case, even though the agent
added words to his signature, showing that he signed in a representa-
tive capacity, such words were deemed merely descriptio personae.
Schumacher v. Dolan, 134 N. W. (Iowa) 624. This rule was established
to aid and encourage the negotiation of commercial paper. Bank v.Love, 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 561. In some jurisdictions, an exception
to the rule arose on the principle, cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex; andwhere an instrument was taken from an agent with knowledge of the
agency, the agent was relieved from liability. Huffcut on Agency, § 123,189; Brockway v. Allen, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 40; Burkhalter v. Perry &
Brown, 56 S. E. (Ga.) 631; 4 Ain. & Eng. Enc. Law, 151; Metcalfe v.
Williams, 1O4 U. S. 93. A few jurisdictions, however, have held, in accord
with the principal case, that evidence of the agency is inadmissible, as
being in violation of the rule excluding parol evidence in variance of theterms of a written agreement. Bryan v. Duff, 12 Wash. 233. The Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, it seems, especially in New York, has codified
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the common law rule with the exception. Megowan v. Peterson, 173
N. Y. i. It is doubtful, however, whether the decision in the principal
case is not strictly in accord with the N. I. L., in that no words were
added by the agent. Section 2o. Courts have felt at liberty to admit
evidence of the agency between the original parties, Keidan v. Winegar,
95 Mich. 430 (at common law); Kerby v. Ruegames, io7 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 491 (under N. I. L.) But it seems there is no valid reason for
excluding such evidence against third parties, when it is established that
such parties had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion of the instrument. National Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307, 311;
National Bank v. Wallis, I5o N. Y. 455, 458; Megowan v. Peterson, supra,
6. It is well settled that collateral agreements between the parties which
are a defense against the payee can be established to bar an action by
a subsequent holder who took with knowledge of such agreements. I Dan-
iel on Negotiable Instruments, (6th ed.) § 156; Higgins v. Ridgway, 153
N. Y. 130.
BRomms-LABITY TO PRINCIPAL FOR UNAUTHORIZED INVESTMENTS BY
AGENT.-TITCOMB v. RICHTER, 93 AT. (CONN.) 526.-Held, brokers are
liable to a client's principal if they allow the client to purchase and sell
stocks on margin with the principal's money knowing that the money
belongs to the principal and was intrusted to the client to invest so as to
produce an income.
Where an agent disposes of his principal's property in excess of his
authority the principal may recover his property from anyone. Bertholf
v. Quinlan Bros., 68 Ill. 297; Kingman v. Pierce, 17 Mass. 247; Thatcher
v. Kaucher, 2 Colo. 698. The principal is not limited to his action against
the agent. Peters v. Ballister, 3 Pick. 495. But the principal must be able
to trace the property or its avails. Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182. Evi-
dence of substantial identity may be attached to the thing itself or be
extraneous; but in either event it is admissible. Farmers' Bank v. King,
57 Pa. St. 202. One who actively assists in an agent's breach of trust
with full knowledge of the agent's duty, and obtains the principal's money,
incurs the same liability to the principal as does the agent. Guernsey v.
Davis, 67 Kans. 378; Perry v. Oerman, 63 W. Va. 566. That the third
party knew when he received the principal's property that the agent was
appropriating it stamps the transaction with fraud. Livermore v. Johnson,
27 Miss. 284. The principal may, if in equity and good conscience entitled
to the money, recover it in an action for money had and received. Lehigh
v. American Brake-Beam Co., 205 Ill. 147. The third party under the
circumstances stated above is guilty of a conversion. Gilmore v. Newton,
9 Allen 171; McCombie v. Davies, 6 East 54o. Hence the principal may
maintain trover. Worthington v. Vette, 77 Mo. App. 445. Money sent
by a principal to his agent in the course of business between them is
often treated by the courts as a trust fund. Roca v. Byrne, supra. The
trust ends when the fund is devoted to the purpose intended; but if the
money is converted, the trust follows it into the hands of the party receiv-
ing it. Central Stock Exchange v. Bendinger, 1og Fed. 926. But to
charge a third person as a party to the misappropriation of a trust fund
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he must knowingly participate in the breach. Perry v. Oerman, supra.
If such person receives the money in good faith, for value and without
notice of the trust so as to acquire an equity superior to that of the true
owners, he is not liable. Central Stock Exchange v. Bendinger, supra.
Treating the property as a trust fund, an action in equity lies. Union
Stock Yards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411. Whether the action be in
quasi-contract, in trover or in equity, the authorities show that the rule
in the principal case is correct.
DEDICATIN-EsToPPEL To ACCEPT.-MAYOR OF BALTImoRE V. CANTON
Co., 93 AmL. (IND.) i44.-Where there has been a dedication of land for
a street, no user by the public or attempted control by the city, but a
long continued user by the dedicating party who has for years paid
taxes assessed by the city on the land, held, that under these facts and
circumstances the city is estopped from asserting any right in the
property and from accepting the dedication.
Dedication is a question of intention, and no particular form is
required to make it valid. A valid dedication may be by a written
instrument, by declaration or by acts. Godfrey v. City of Alton, 12
Ill. 29; Smith v. Town of Flora, 64 Ill. 93. An acceptance is always
necessary (Riley v. Hammel, 38 Conn. 574), and must be made within
a reasonable time. Niles v. Los Angeles, 125 Cal. 572. An acceptance
may be by user by the public. Hast v. Railroad Co., 52 W. Va. 396.
An acceptance by a municipality is binding upon the dedicator. City of
Eureka v. Armstrong, 83 Cal. 623. There seems to be little conflict
on the proposition that a city may be estopped from asserting a right
in the property dedicated. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind.
21, holds that, a dedication being to the public, a city, as the trustee
of the rights of the public, cannot be estopped by its acts from main-
taining the rights of the public. In that case, however, the grant became
irrevocable, lots having been sold with reference to the parts dedicated.
Gillean v. City of Frost, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 371, follows the case last
cited, but may be explained also by the fact that an acceptance is shown
by user by the public. Many cases hold that a re-occupation by the
grantor for a long time will estop a city from accepting the dedication.
Town of Cambridge v. Cook, 97 Iowa 602; Village of Grandville v.
Jenison, 84 Mich. 54; Village of Vermont v. Miller, i61 Ill. 21o. But
here the clement of acceptance within a reasonable time is evidently lack-
ing and estoppel is not necessary. Simplot v. City of Dubuque, 49 Iowa
630, and Smith v. City of Osage, 8o Iowa 84, hold that where the right
of use of the locus has been abandoned and taxes have been assessed
and collected on the land in question the city is estopped from setting
up any claim to the land. In the first of these two cases an abandonment
and reverter to the grantor is shown. In the second case there was no
acceptance within a reasonable time. Hanger v. City of DesMoines, iog
Iowa 480, holds that dedicated land in the actual possession of the public
on which taxes have been collected for several years may be claimed
by the city and the doctrine of estoppel does not apply. It is obvious
that estoppel does not apply where there is an acceptance and a
continued user.
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In all the cases above cited and in the principal case the doctrine of
estoppel is invoked when not necessary to the decision. The use of
estoppel in these cases savors of a "legal short-cut."
RAILROADS--MORTGAGEs-ROLLING STOCK.-BooTH ET AL. V. CENTRAL SAV-
INGS BANK, x46 PAC. (COLO.) 24o.-Plantiff was mortgagee for the bond-
holders of a railroad. The mortgage specifically named the rolling stock
of the road. It was not recorded according to the law governing chattel
mortgages but was recorded in accordance with the real estate mortgage
law. Held, that the mortgage is binding on the rolling stock as against
the lien of judgment creditors because the rolling stock is a fixture, a
permanent accession, and therefore realty.
The federal courts and a few of the states are in harmony with the
principal case. They go on the theory that without the cars the road
would be useless, inoperative and valueless and so they become fixtures
when they are incorporated as a part of the railroad system. Milwaukee
& M. R. Co. v. Milwaukee etc., R. Co., 2 Wall. 6og; Farmer's Loan &
Trust Co. v. Saint Joseph etc., R. Co., 3 Dill. 412; Morrill v. Noyes, 56
Me. 458. But rolling stock does not become a fixture so as to subordi-
nate the vendor's lien to a mortgage covering after-acquired property
because it is capable of separable ownership, not being actually attached
to the land like the rails. U. S. v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 12 Wall.
362. In most of the state courts, on the other hand, it has been held
that a mortgage of the real estate of a railroad company does not include
the cars. Randall v. Elwell, 52 N. Y. 521; Boston etc., R. Co. v. Gil-
more, 37 N. H. 410; Williamson v. N. J. So. R. Co., 29 N. J. Eq. 311;
Beardsley v. Ontario Bank, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 61g. A levy on the cars
of a railroad company was held good in Midland R. Co. v. Stevenson,
130 Ind. 97. The principal case is in accord with the holdings in the
federal courts but is contrary to the rule adopted in a majority of the
states.
STATUTE OF FRAuDs-CoNTRAcTs NOT TO BE PERFORMED wITHEIN A YEAR-
CONTRACT To REAR AND MAINTAIN A CEIU..-MYERS V. SALTRY, 173 S. W.
(Ky.) I138.-Held, an oral contract binding one to rear and maintain
another's child until the child's maturity is not within the statute of
frauds requiring contracts to be in writing which are not to be per-
formed in a year from the making thereof, for the child may die
within the year and thereby terminate the contract.
It is well settled that an agreement is not within the statute merely
because performance may extend over more than a year. Warner v.
Texas & Pacific R. R., 164 U. S. 418; Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn.
495; Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544. Promises which by their terms
extend during the life of the promisor or promisee are not within the
statute. Boggs v. Laundry Co., 86 Mo. App. 616; McCabe v. Green,
45 N. J. L. 723. Likewise, contracts which are to be performed at the
death of a person are not within the statute. Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y.
56o; Hayes v. Jackson, 154 Mass. 451. Where only one of the parties
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is to perform his part within one year some cases hold that the contract
is not within the statute. Fernald v. Gilman, 123 Fed. 797; Bliss v.
Jenkins, 129 Mo. 647; Bennett v. Mahler, go App. Div. (N. Y.) 22.
Contra, Kelley v. Thompson, 175 Mass. 427; Deetrich v. Hoefelmeir, 128
Mich. 145; Parks v. Francis, 5o Vt. 626. An agreement to support a
minor until he arrives at maturity has been held not to be within the
statute. Wooldridge v. Stern, 42 Fed. 311; White v. Murtland, 71 Ill.
25o; McKinney v. McClosky, 76 N. Y. 594; Taylor v. Deseve, 81 Tex.
264. If such a contract is not within the statute, it seems that no
personal contract ought to be. Contra, Goodrich v. Johnson, 66 Ind. 258.
But still the courts agree that a contract of personal services for a
definite period for more than one year is within the statute, though
it is submitted that the same reasoning applies here that does in the
previous group of cases. Hill v. Hooper, i Gray 131; Squire, v. Whipple,
I Vt. 69; Wahl v. Barnum, 116 N. Y. 87. But see contra, Shropshire
v. Adams, 4o Tex. Cir. App. 339; Wynn v. Folowell, 98 Mo. App. 463.
It would seem that on principle the decision in the principal case is
questionable but the weight of authority seems to support it.
